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Articles
Kelsen and Blumenberg: The Legitimacy  
of the Modern Age
Christoph Kletzer*
‘You ought to φ’
‘Says who?’
‘Says I’ 
A. IntroductIon 
to many it seems plausible, or at least inconsequential, to accept the idea that our con-
cept of normativity is but a secularised version of a fundamentally theological idea. 
However, if this were the case, the existence, or, more importantly, the non-existence of 
God would be of the utmost importance. In this case our secular concept would indeed 
be incomplete and the commonly experienced difficulty of making sound sense of a 
statement like ‘A ought to φ’ would be down to the simple fact that without a divine leg-
islator the ‘oughtness’ of such a statement would lack a sufficient objective grounding. It 
would hang in mid-air. 
So for those of us who do not believe that God exists, or who think his existence or 
non-existence should not play a role in determining the range of things we ought and 
ought not to do, the secularisation thesis must be deeply troubling. 
now, the difficulty concerns not only normativity and validity, but all core concepts 
of the conceptual inventory of the modern age—autonomy, personality, reason, com-
munity, history and progress, to mention just a few. If they are but secularised versions 
of fundamentally theological concepts, then the prime theological fact—the existence 
of God—must be relevant for them. It is in this sense that the problems of the claimed 
secularisation of a theological estate and the problem of the legitimacy of the modern 
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age are inextricably linked: the thesis of secularisation, however harmless it may seem, is 
a thesis principally directed against the legitimacy of the modern age. 
Still, there is hardly a political theorist who has not at some point in his intellectual 
life alluded to or straightforwardly made the claim that some or all of our modern con-
cepts are but secularised variants of originally theological concepts. take Weber’s thesis 
that modern capitalism is, at least in spirit, a secularised version of calvinism’s views on 
predetermination and salvation; or Marx’s claim that the forms and institutions of our 
modern, liberal, democratic state are but secularised, and thus equally deficient, yet even 
more deceptive variants of an originally religious anaesthetic, lulling people into accept-
ing prevailing injustice and that ‘indeed, it is not the so-called Christian state, which 
recognises christianity as its basis, its state religion … that is the perfected christian 
state, but rather the atheistic state, the democratic state that is the perfected christian 
state’;1 take Schmitt’s claim that all significant concepts of modern theory of the state 
are secularised theological concepts; or Anscombe’s claim that our modern normative 
vocabulary of moral duties and moral oughts is an illegitimate remnant of a theologi-
cal system conceptually dependent on a now absent divine lawgiver; or the idea that the 
modern work ethos is a secularisation of christian self-denial; or the idea that modern 
conceptions of equality are secularised version of equality before god; or the idea that 
modern concepts of human rights and universal human dignity are secularised version 
of the imago dei principle; or the idea that modern concepts of legitimate political domi-
nation cannot be derived from contractual grounds, from right and liberty but are all 
varieties of divine domination and cannot be explained otherwise; or Löwith’s idea that 
the Marxist prophecy of the communist millennium is a secularised version of the last 
judgement and that all philosophies of history are secularisations of christian eschatol-
ogy; or Vögelin’s claim that modernity is but an outgrowth of the greatest and most 
dangerous christian heresies, namely Gnosticism. the list could go on and on. 
now, whatever judgement these theories—which are mostly presented en passant 
and rarely bear the weight of sustained argument—deliver on the legitimacy and appli-
cability of our modern vocabulary, it remains a curious fact that arguments of this kind 
have a strangely satisfying and soothing effect on people who read a lot. the secularisa-
tion thesis reassures us that despite the fact that the modern age has to understand its 
own beginning as a harsh caesura with the past and, indeed, to define itself in opposition 
to antecedent ages, we can still muse on some deep undercurrents that intimately con-
nect the modern age with the middle ages and antiquity. 
All this taken together—(i) the intellectual lure and surface plausibility of the vari-
ous secularisation theses, (ii) the seeming harmlessness of such rumination purely in 
the field of the history of ideas, and (iii) their inherent dangerousness—can help us 
understand what drove Hans Kelsen to write one of his strangest books, Secular Reli-
1 Karl Marx, ‘on the Jewish Question’ in J o’Malley (ed and trans), Early Political Writings (cambridge 
university Press, 1994) 28, 38. 
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gion.2 In this book Kelsen tries to secure the legitimacy of the modern age ex negativo, 
by minutely refuting each and every attempt to de-legitimise the modern age known to 
him; he consequently finds himself in the strange position of having to defend nietzsche 
against Heidegger and Marx against Löwith. of course, Kelsen himself was neither a 
nietzschenean nor a Marxist. However, the attacks of Heidegger and Löwith must have 
appeared to him to be so dangerous that he found himself forced to defend at least the 
possibility of a nietzschenean and Marxist standpoint. 
As a piece of philosophic literature Secular Religion is so peculiar that Kelsen himself 
did not want to see it published in his lifetime.3 that it appeared nonetheless is to be 
credited to the courageous decision of the Hans Kelsen Institute in Vienna, which made 
an undoubtedly difficult yet correct call. After all, apart from making some substantially 
interesting arguments, this work at least makes clear where Kelsen (who himself was 
not hostile to analogies of secularisation) stood on this matter, ie that he thought that a 
transformation of heuristic analogies into a fully fledged thesis about the permanence of 
a historically secularised essence is not only illegitimate but dangerous. 
What remains unclear, however, is whether Kelsen in Secular Religion chose the via 
negativa for want of better alternatives or rather precisely because he was aware of the 
precarious state of the modern age, according to which any positive demonstration of its 
legitimacy has to be excluded as it would have to make reference to anti-modern tropes.
After all, asking for the ‘legitimacy of modernity’ already points squarely at the crux 
of the problem: asking for legitimacy requires as a possible answer some historical medi-
ation, some genealogy, some continuity of whatever form. Legitimacy is a diachronical 
category. Modernity, in contrast, fundamentally denies the need for such a historical 
mediation. Asking for the legitimacy of modernity must therefore, if it does not want to 
end up in a paradox formulated as a question, be the question for how an age that denies 
the need for legitimation can be legitimate.
now this is precisely the dilemma with which Hans Blumenberg struggled in his 
work The Legitimacy of the Modern Age,4 which first appeared in 1966 and re-appeared 
in 1999 with extensive replies to critics. the problem he is tackling is the legitimacy 
of an epoch, which itself must not ask questions of legitimacy, as it would thereby be 
driven beyond its own horizon of justification, yet it is confronted with the question of 
2 Hans Kelsen, Secular Religion: A Polemic against the Misinterpretation of Modern Social Philosophy, Science 
and Politics as New Religions, r Potz, c Jabloner and K Zeleny (eds) (Springer, 2012).
3 A discussion and assessment of the reasons Kelsen might have had for recalling the finished work from 
print can be found in the preface to Secular Religion and in Iain Stewart, ‘Kelsen, the Enlightenment and 
Modern Premodernists’ (2012) 37 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 251.
4 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, robert M Wallace (trans) (MIt Press, 1985). For an 
introduction see Laurence dickey, ‘Blumenberg and Secularization: “Self-Assertion” and the Problem of 
Self-realizing teleology in History’ (1987) 41 New German Critique 151 (Special Issue on the critiques 
of the Enlightenment); robert Pippin, ‘Blumenberg and the Modernity Problem’ in Idealism as Modern-
ism (cambridge university Press, 1999); robert M Wallace, ‘Progress, Secularization and Modernity: the 
Löwith-Blumenberg debate’ (1981) 22 New German Critique 63 (Special Issue on Modernism).
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legitimacy in the form of the thesis of secularisation. the thesis of secularisation thus 
sets the modern age a trap by setting up the alternative for it of either defending its own 
legitimacy and thus relying on counter-modern resources or not defending it and thus 
opening up the doors for counter-modern sources of legitimacy. A possible defence of 
modernity against its enemies thus cannot proceed in a straightforward manner but has 
to argue obliquely: either (i) one follows a via negativa and tries to refute each and every 
strategy of de-legitimation individually; or (ii) one demonstrates that these strategies of 
de-legitimation are all mistaken since they burden the modern age with questions which 
are at the same time unanswerable and non-pertinent. 
In this paper I am going to try to demonstrate cum Blumenberg that Kelsen’s Pure 
theory is a legal theory, which both accepts and masters the challenge of producing a 
thoroughly modern legal theory. In this self-reflection and self-assertion in terms of a 
history of ideas the Pure theory still stands unchallenged. 
B. tHE contExt oF SEcuLArISAtIon
Let us begin by introducing two concepts of secularisation which will not directly engage 
us in this paper. the first is a concept of secularisation that is used in legal history; in this 
context ‘secularisation’ can either mean the appropriation of ecclesiastic property by the 
secular powers or simply the on-going separation of state and church. the second is the 
concept of secularisation used in sociology, where it refers to the empirically perceivable 
retreat of religious practices in societies and the hollowing out of the relevance of reli-
gious norms of action. 
We are not going to concern ourselves with these two forms of secularisation. What 
we are focusing on is a third concept of secularisation, which understands secularisa-
tion in terms of the history of ideas. the idea of secularisation here is the following: the 
fundamental concepts of modernity, concepts which we in no way see connected to god 
or religion, actually are the same concepts which have played a fundamental role in a 
theological world-view, only that God does not exist any longer. 
Attached to this idea of the inheritance of a conceptual universe, which is missing 
its dominant signifier, of a ship without a captain, are a host of ideas about the resulting 
illegitimacy of modernity. We can construct the following typology of de-legitimation 
consisting of increasingly pessimistic theses about the relation of the modern age and 
the theological universe: 
(a) ‘the modern age is unthinkable without christianity.’ this is the weakest form of 
a secularisation thesis, if it is to be considered a secularisation thesis at all. What it 
claims is simply that we can only understand the modern age in the light of its chris-
tian antecedent. 
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(b) ‘the modern age was incomplete.’ According to this claim, secularised theological 
concepts used to form a part of the modern vocabulary and thereby threatened its 
legitimacy. However, in the meantime they have all been replaced by unsuspicious 
ones. People who hold this thesis would claim that in Kantian terms we live in an 
enlightened age. 
(c) ‘the modern age is incomplete but inherently completable.’ this thesis claims that 
there are still theological concepts at the heart of the conceptual inventory of the 
modern age and that even though we might not have been able to jettison all of 
them, we are on the right track and principally capable of completing modernity. 
Modernity is a yet unfinished project. Again, in Kantian language: we live in an age 
of enlightenment. 
(d) ‘the modern age is a mirage.’ According to this thesis the modern age is incomplete, 
yet inherently not completable. the secularised theological concepts that lie at its 
core are both essentially theological, and central and irreplaceable for the modern 
age. Modernity is thus a fundamentally incoherent project. We cannot complete 
modernity without overcoming it. Modernity thus pretends to be able to deliver 
something which it cannot deliver. It is a dead end, a Holzweg. Somewhere in history, 
we took a wrong turn. What we should do is give up this entire project of modernity 
and start anew. 
(e) ‘the modern age is ruinous.’ the modern age is a ruin, ie the concepts and institu-
tions of modernity are but the remnants of a formerly complete and comprehensive 
cultural and conceptual universe. there is something dead about modernity. GEM 
Anscombe, for instance, thinks that we have retained a concept of normativity 
which is oriented on a divine lawgiver and pointless without such a lawgiver.5 While 
the divine lawgiver has vanished, the normative concepts dependent on him have 
remained. these concepts are thus empty shells, at best pointless, at worst confus-
ing and harmful. We have to jettison these concepts and develop new ones derived 
not from a divine lawgiver but from facts about human psychology. of course, a 
hundred years earlier nietzsche pondered the same issue and came to the conclu-
sion that it is not as easy to jettison these ideas. It will take another thousand years 
to come to terms with the fact that God has died. our entire thinking, our language, 
our grammar, our epistemology is stung by the theological sting.
(f) ‘the modern age is deceptive.’ It is not only the case that modernity is incoherent 
and thus cannot be completed, it also pretends to be able to finally deliver truth 
and justice. All it does, however, is present us with old wine in new bottles. Marx, 
for example, argues that the modern liberal state and its ideas of justice are a mere 
secularisation of religious narratives of salvation. Both modern political justice and 
5 See GEM Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) 33 Philosophy 1.
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religious salvation are imaginations, and whereas in religious thought true human 
satisfaction is postponed to the afterlife, in the modern secular state true human 
satisfaction is declared to have already been achieved, albeit in the abstract realm of 
rights, the rule of law and personality. these concepts are just as fictitious as is the 
idea of a Garden of Eden. Actually these modern, secularised concepts are even more 
devious as it is harder to see through their unreality. In any case they form part of a 
narrative, which serves the ultimate purpose of appeasing and anaesthetising people, 
and offering them ‘political emancipation’, in order that they do not demand actual 
human emancipation.
(g) ‘the modern age is heretic.’ It is not only the case that modernity is chimerical, 
ruinous and deceptive, it is also a work of the devil insofar as it is the outgrowth of 
the most dangerous of christian heresies, namely Gnosticism. this is the view of 
authors like Vögelin. 
Modernity carries within itself a certain reserve as concerns legitimation; its essence lies 
in rejecting the previous standards of legitimation as exaggerated and metaphysically 
overexerted. At the same time, however, it cannot, on threat of inconsistency, satisfac-
torily and conclusively demonstrate the illegitimacy of the previous, excessive standards 
of legitimation. Its demonstration of the illegitimacy of these standards can thus only 
ever claim a lesser degree of legitimacy than the criticised maintenance of the higher 
standards of legitimacy. Modernity thus must not sufficiently justify the unjustifiability 
of over-stretched campaigns of justification if it itself does not want to attract the charge 
of over-exerting its justificatory powers. this is why the modern age holds within it a 
deficit, a gap, which it can only fill by means of a simple assertion.
Accordingly, in his Secular Religion Kelsen tries to demonstrate the legitimacy of 
modernity negatively, by refuting all attempts to de-legitimise the modern age. this is 
what makes the book so troubling from an argumentative point of view. After all, a justi-
fication by refuting all possible refutations can at best only ever be provisional. 
that Kelsen chose this strategy is even more surprising as in the Pure theory one 
can find lines of argument which are less defensive and negative yet which do not gloss 
over the troubles inherent in defending the modern age. there are two lines of argument 
we are going to pursue here: one is the Kantian argument that demands a transition of a 
theocentric to an anthropocentric paradigm of validity; the second is a by and large Blu-
menbergian refusal to answer a question of legitimacy that relies on pre-modern criteria, 
a refusal which finds its expression in the Basic norm. 
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c. KELSEn And KAnt: tHE AntHroPocEntrIc VIEW oF LAW
A kind of secularisation thesis can, of course, also be found at the heart of Kant’s criti-
cal philosophy. to be sure, Kant does not attempt to undermine modernity, but aims 
to sketch out with more clarity and detail the contours of a completion of the modern 
project by highlighting the theological, pre-modern remainders in our everyday episte-
mological model and by indicating a way to rid ourselves of these remainders. 
the point that Kant makes is that in our everyday model of knowledge we essentially 
rely on the idea of god as a regulative idea. Henry Allison put it as follows: 
By such a [theocentric] model I understand a programme or method of epistemological 
reflection, according to which human knowledge is analysed and evaluated in terms of its con-
formity, or lack thereof, to the standard of cognition theoretically achievable by an ‘absolute’ 
or ‘infinite intellect’. By the latter I understand one that is not encumbered by the limitations 
of the human intellect, and which, therefore, knows objects ‘as they are in themselves’. Such 
an intellect functions in this model essentially as a regulative idea in the Kantian sense. thus 
the appeal to it does not commit one either to the existence of such an intellect or to the 
assumption that knowledge of this type is actually possessed by the human mind. the point is 
only that a hypothetical ‘God’s-eye view’ of things is used as a standard in terms of which the 
‘objectivity’ of human knowledge is analysed.6
Implicitly, we all carry within ourselves a model of knowledge according to which our 
representations of the world are true if and only if they correspond with the things as 
they actually are in themselves. It is hard for us to even conceive of an alternative model 
of truth and knowledge. However, only an absolute intellect has access to the things 
as they are in themselves, independently of our apperception. In our ordinary, every-
day model of knowledge, and be it a thoroughly empiristic or naturalistic one, we thus 
implicitly refer to a divine point of view—a point of view, however, which we can never 
inhabit. Sceptical arguments, which deny the possibility of any access to truth, rest their 
plausibility precisely on this difference between a divine and human point of view. the 
refutation of the sceptic thus does not consist in the demonstration of a flaw in his argu-
ment, but in the rejection of the standards of true knowledge that he presupposes. 
conversely, the Critique of Pure Reason tries to develop a theory of knowledge purely 
from the human point of view, ie a theory of knowledge which at no point makes use 
of a divine point of view. the major task of such a theory consists in re-interpreting the 
object of knowledge from the thing in itself to a phenomenal object of cognition so that
the cognitive structure of the human mind is viewed as the source of certain conditions which 
must be met by anything that is to be represented as an object by such a mind.7
6 Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defence (Yale university Press, 1983) 
19. 
7 Ibid, 29. 
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now, the Pure theory, too, is an attempt to overcome the implicit and hidden theo-
centric convictions in our understanding of legal validity and to reach a thoroughly 
anthropocentric understanding of the positive law. 
Let it be noted at this stage, however, that Kelsen, in contrast to Kant, was of the 
opinion that the category of the ought, just as the category of being, is not further ana-
lysable. As is well known, Kant, in contrast, tried to demonstrate in his Groundwork that 
‘I ought to φ’ can only mean ‘I already want to φ under the conditions of rationality’. ‘I 
ought to brush my teeth’ thus means: ‘given that I want to look, smell and be healthy, and 
given that I am a rational agent and given that brushing my teeth is necessary for look-
ing, smelling and being healthy, I already want to brush my teeth.’ Similarly ‘I ought not 
to steal’ means: ‘given that all wanting already means wanting to consider myself a free 
and rational agent in all of my acts and given that in wanting to steal I cannot possibly 
consider myself a free and rational agent, I already do not want to steal.’ 
It is equally well known that Kelsen thought precisely this ‘condition of rationality’ 
problematic. After all, rather than being a solution it is a formulation of the original 
problem and leads us back into metaphysics, since in this ‘condition of rationality’ God is 
used quite straightforwardly as a regulative idea. Kelsen thus accuses Kant of not having 
applied the same anti-metaphysical rigour in his practical philosophy as he used in his 
theoretical philosophy. 
But if the ‘ought’ in ‘A ought to φ’ is unanalysable and the other elements in this 
statement are mere variables, how can such a statement ever be understood? Accord-
ing to Kelsen, such a statement can only be understood in its relation to other ought 
statements, ie statements which regulate the creation of norms and thus the mediation 
of is and ought. Viewed entirely from the human point of view, only man can be legis-
lator, can be the mediator of is and ought. only a norm, be it a legal or a moral norm, 
which authorises the creation of another norm, can illuminate the meaning of this cre-
ated norm as norm. this is what Kelsen called the ‘objective meaning’ of a norm, ie the 
meaning of a norm which is only illuminated in the light of another norm, a norm that 
authorises its creation. this meaning is, to be sure, the only meaning of a norm. this 
means that in an anthropocentric model of validity no norm can be valid in isolation, 
no norm can be valid in and for itself. ‘A ought to φ’ thus means that A ought φ under 
the condition that ‘A ought to φ’ has been enacted by a competent organ (which could 
very well be a moral organ). More cannot be said about this if we do not wish to enter 
metaphysics. 
the objective meaning of norms therein always already presupposes a basic norm. 
By presupposing the basic norm, however, it is not meant that whenever I want to furnish 
a norm with objective validity I only have to presuppose a fitting basic norm (as if it 
were an antecedent psychological act), but rather that, as soon as I pose the question of 
the objective validity, as soon as I have understood this question, I have already presup-
posed the basic norm. the presupposition of the basic norm is not a psychological act, 
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but a logical relation in the sense that the objective validity presupposes the validity of 
the basic norm. 
d. KELSEn And BLuMEnBErG: ModErnItY AS tHE SEcond  
oVErcoMInG oF GnoStIcISM 
However, in isolation such a solution of the problem of validity in terms of legal theory 
remains sterile and leaves a feeling of dissatisfaction. this feeling of dissatisfaction, in 
turn, however, is not born out of a deficiency of this solution in terms of legal theory, but 
of a misunderstanding at the level of the history of ideas: 
By trusting that it had to give a definite answer to the questions raised by the overcoming of 
natural law, an answer that differs from the answer given by natural law, the prevailing doc-
trine in jurisprudence has fundamentally misunderstood the meaning of this overcoming of 
natural law, which does actually consist in rejecting all questions of the fundamental ground 
of validity of the legal order, for a further justification of the law by means of a higher order 
and in postulating the legal order as the highest order, i.e. as an order which cannot be derived 
from another order, as sovereign order.8 
What Kelsen here alludes to is that the most basic question about legal validity cannot be 
solved by an answer but by a rejection of the question.9 He thus hints at the transforma-
tion of a problem of legal theory into a problem of the history of ideas, a transformation, 
however, which he delivers neither in his Pure Theory nor in his Secular Religion. 
to be sure, the performative act of ‘a rejection of the question’ alone cannot do all 
the work. What is needed is a theory of modernity that is sufficiently grounded in the 
history of ideas. And despite his efforts in Vergeltung und Kausalität,10 in Society and 
Nature11 and finally in Secular Religion, Kelsen has not delivered such a theory. It is Hans 
Blumenberg who produces what Kelsen only hints at: the rejection of the question has 
to be historically grounded and it can only be grounded in a demonstration that in these 
kinds of question the modern age asks something of itself, which it neither can nor has 
to ask of itself, that it expects an answer to a question, which is not its own question. 
8 Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (Mohr Siebeck, 1920) 88.
9 It may on a superficial reading appear that Hart has put forward a similar argument in his claim that asking 
whether the rule of recognition is valid is as pointless as asking whether the metre bar in Paris is actually 
one metre long. However, Hart’s argument differs from Kelsen’s. What he does is to invoke a convention, 
a collective stipulation, and to claim that such manoeuvres do not allow for the question of correctness. 
Kelsen and Blumenberg, conversely, try to resolve the question of the validity of the basic norm in terms of 
a history of ideas. See HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (oxford university Press, 1961) 106.
10 Hans Kelsen, Vergeltung und Kausalität. Eine soziologische Untersuchung (WP Van Stockum en Zoon, 1941). 
See also Hans Kelsen, ‘causality and retribution’ (1941) 8 Philosophy of Science 533.
11 Hans Kelsen, Society and Nature: A Sociological Inquiry (Lawbook Exchange, 2009). 
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As the comprehensive, and rather exuberant, learnedness of Blumenberg’s The 
Legitimacy of the Modern Age makes a detailed introduction to this work futile, all that 
remains for us is to do is to isolate the arguments relevant to our purpose. In this context 
Blumenberg provides at least three loosely connected arguments: (1) the secularisation 
thesis rests on an incoherent concept of ‘world’, a concept which, furthermore, is itself 
the result of a secularisation within christianity. (2) the illegitimacy of the modern age 
is an illusion created by the secularisation thesis and the ideas of trans-epochal ques-
tions that come with it; the questions which the modern age asks itself in the discourse 
of secularisation are overblown, excessive questions which necessarily lead into error. (3) 
the modern age does not consist in the secularisation of christian content, but in the 
self-assertion of man and his curiosity in a world which has been identified by christian-
ity as being godforsaken. 
(1) the concept of world employed by the secularisation thesis — According to Blu-
menberg the idea of secularisation presupposes a concept of world which is highly 
problematic. He illustrates this by quoting Hannah Arendt: 
Whatever the word ‘secular’ is meant to signify in current usage, historically it cannot possibly 
be equated with worldliness; modern man at any rate did not gain this world when he lost the 
other world, and he did not gain life, strictly speaking, either; he was thrust back upon it.12
the main point here is the following: what we want to describe with the concept of 
secularisation, ie the loss of the ‘other world’ and the gaining of ‘this world’, itself has 
repercussions for our understanding of the concept of what a ‘world’ is. Secularisation 
thus cannot possibly be understood as a calm transition of an enduring essence or a 
unified function from an ecclesial into a secular hand. thus, insofar as the secularisation 
thesis wants to convey more than just the loss of the influence of religion, the secu-
larisation of a theological substance or function necessarily transforms this substance or 
function in such a way that we can no longer speak of a ‘secularisation’ of anything that 
remains constant. this highlights the fundamental contradiction in the secularisation 
thesis, which tries to claim two things at the same time: a radical change of world and 
an identity. thereby it ‘introduces into our understanding of history the paradox that 
we can grasp the modern age’s basic characteristic of “worldliness” only under condi-
tions that, precisely on account of this quality, must be inaccessible to us’.13 In actual 
fact the secularisation thesis is not in earnest with the change of world but rather, in the 
name of functional and substantial identity, aims at revealing the change of world as a 
pseudo-change and wants to convict modernity’s differences from the religious age of a 
fundamental deficiency. 
12 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (university of chicago Press, 1958) 320 cited in Blumenberg (n 4) 
9. 
13 Blumenberg (n 4) 10. 
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the illegitimacy of the result of secularisation resides in the fact that the result is not allowed 
to secularise the process from which it resulted. For the hermeneutic function remains legiti-
mate only as long as it lays open to self-consciousness what is hidden from it, convicts it of 
having been subject to the illusion of autonomous presence, and thus binds it to the newly 
disclosed dimension.14 
thus it is not the case that modernity was a secularisation of christianity but rather that 
this, what we now call secularisation, is the emergence of a genuinely secular element 
from within christianity (for instance of stoicism)15 which was present in christian-
ity from the very beginning. this means that secularisation is not a renunciation of 
the essence of christianity, but the very realisation and actualisation of it. ‘What might 
appear to be a secularised reconstruction can always be the worldly original itself again.’16
thus when we speak about modernity as a secularisation as a ‘making worldly’ of 
christianity, we therein presuppose a very certain christian sense of ‘unworldliness’. 
of course, the question is how precisely to understand this unworldliness. Blumenberg 
thinks that the platonic/neoplatonic concept of transcendence has superimposed the 
genuinely christian un-worldliness with a spatial ‘outer-worldliness’. this misunder-
standing still determines our concept of secularisation: what has been outside this world 
is taken into this world. ‘only something, which by virtue of its descent or specificity is 
taken to be extraworldly, can be secularised (made worldly).’17 Secularisation can thus 
only be understood as a kind of transformation of an essence from one world to the 
other. However, the christian unworldliness was of a totally different kind: ‘An inter-
est in the world is not just put into question by the presence of an alternative; rather it 
is robbed of all meaning because no time remains for the world.’18 thus, the christian 
unworldliness is an absolute one, a hermetic one, one which has no ‘outer’. In the original 
christian sense there is nothing there that can be secularised. It was only the deferment 
of the Parousia that made space for transcendence and thus also for a ‘this world’ (Dies-
seits). What made possible the acceptance of the further existence of world, a further 
existence which was fundamentally at odds with revelation, was not the idea that this, 
which ought to have happened, was projected into the future, but the claim that it had 
already happened, albeit on a different level. ‘If one wished to characterise the process I 
have outlined as one of “secularization”—even though historically it does present itself 
14 Ibid, 18. 
15 Blumenberg here refers to dilthey, who praised the Stoic tradition against Aristotle. According to dilthey 
the following were of importance: ‘the precedence that it gave to ethics and its instrumentalisation of 
physics for that end, its logic of hypothetical inferences, its anthropological model of the wise man as the 
invulnerable and inaccessible autarkic subject, the inaccessibility of consciousness to physical contingency 
and empirical uncertainty.’ Ibid, 39. 
16 Ibid, 39.
17 Ibid, 42 (translation altered by c Kletzer). 
18 Ibid, 42 .
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in an unexpected place—then in any case it would be not the secularization of eschatol-
ogy but rather secularization by eschatology.’19
We can sum up as follows: the thesis of secularisation claims that an ecclesial con-
tent is transformed into a worldly content. However, by ‘worldly’ we make reference to a 
world which only emerged in christianity as it became necessary to deal with the defer-
ment of the Parousia. the secularisation thesis presupposes a two-world cosmos. this, 
however, is the result of a complex history. In order to speak of secularisation at all we 
need a concept of worldliness. this concept, which is assumed by the secularisation the-
sis to be simply given, is itself a result of an inner-christian secularisation by eschatology, 
ie of the need to deal with the illegitimate continued existence of the world.
(2) ‘Big’ questions — Blumenberg claims that christianity itself was forced by the defer-
ment of the Last Judgement to make place for a worldly world. now, the modern age 
inherits, if not the world, then the space which was made available to it. With this space 
it also inherits the possible answers and with them the associated overblown questions 
of the christian epoch. 
the modern age accepted problems as set for it that the Middle Age had posed and suppos-
edly answered but that had only been posed precisely because the people thought they already 
possessed the ‘answers’.20 
In contrast to this we have to
free ourselves from the idea that there is a firm canon of the ‘great questions’ which through-
out history and with an unchanging urgency have occupied human curiosity and motivated 
our world- and self-interpretation.21
rather, each epoch asks its own questions. By questioning the modern age in relation 
to its legitimacy we ask a question which does not belong to the modern age; we ask an 
anachronistic question, a question in the overcoming of which the modern age consists. 
now, the problem is that the modern age cannot get rid of this question of legiti-
macy simply by claiming not to be able to cope with the question, since ‘every attempt 
at resignation with respect to the unknowable then meets with the reproach of being 
“positivist”’.22 And it is precisely this reproach that Kelsen faces. 
thus, as we know, the modern age found it impossible to decline to answer questions about 
the totality of history. to that extent the philosophy of history is an attempt to answer a medi-
eval question by means available to a post-medieval age. In this process, the idea of progress 
19 Ibid, 45.
20 Ibid, 48.
21 Ibid, 65.
22 Ibid, 48.
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is driven to a level of generality that overextends its original, regionally circumscribable and 
objectively limited range as an assertion.23 
to speak of legitimacy of the modern age only makes sense when this legitimacy is con-
tested. 
If one, however, prefers to speak of ‘functions’ which remain constant through-
out the epochs and which have been secularised in the modern age, then Blumenberg 
counters that christianity had introduced so many functions which it could only fulfil 
by dubious operators like ‘God’ or the ‘hereafter’ and which have prompted questions 
which it neither could answer itself nor could be answered by the modern age. Blumen-
berg compares the situation here with Leibnitz’s critique of descartes: 
through the radicalness of descartes’s doubt and the questionable perspicuity of its elimina-
tion he had introduced into the world a demand for certainty, which on account of the rigour 
of its requirements could not be fulfilled by him or by anyone else, but which could not be 
revoked and rejected merely on account of the impossibility of satisfying it.24 
In analogy to that, 
the reoccupation that is the reality underlying the appearance of secularisation is driven by 
the neediness of a consciousness that has been overextended and then disappointed in regard 
to the great questions and great hopes.25 
the illusion of a secularisation of religious substances or functions can be understood 
as follows: we have assumed overextended questions from a previous epoch and are dis-
appointed by the modern age insofar as we understand the latter to be an inadequate 
catalogue of answers to these questions. the thesis of secularisation is thus a mere symp-
tom of an expectation which has been disappointed by overstretched questions. the 
solution consists in the insight that these questions are not our questions, that they are 
genuinely alien. 
(3) Self-assertion — the problem of the legitimacy of the modern age thus is that 
legitimacy and modernity exclude each other insofar as the former demands historic con-
tinuity and mediation, whereas the latter excludes such continuity and mediation. What 
we are thus looking for is a concept that reconciles both, a concept which presents the 
new beginning as a historic event in such a way that the historical mediation does not 
suspend the originality and the originality does not compromise the historical media-
tion. the concept that manages such a reconciliation is the concept of self-assertion. 
23 Ibid, 48–49.
24 Ibid, 65. 
25 Ibid, 89.
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In this context Blumenberg distinguishes between self-empowerment and self-asser-
tion. the former is ‘to say that a rationalism has no need of historic justification, that 
it constructs itself autonomously from within itself and is indifferent to the conditions 
prevailing at the time when it is put into effect’. In contrast, self-assertion means ‘to insist 
that the doubtful and in fact disputed claim made by this rationality to have substituted 
a standardised process for the contingency of history has a specific historical function’.26 
now, since self-assertion always has the character of a reply, so the modern age as an 
epoch has the character of a reply. 
Legitimacy becomes a subject of discussion only when it is disputed. the occasion for talk 
of the legitimacy of the modern age does not lie in the fact that this age conceives of itself as 
conforming to reason and as realising this conformity in the Enlightenment but rather in the 
syndrome of the assertions that this epochal conformity to reason is nothing but an aggres-
sion (which fails to understand itself as such) against theology, from which it has in fact in a 
hidden manner derived everything that belongs to it.27 
Blumenberg here lays out in detail what Kelsen could have meant by the claim that the 
overcoming of natural law has to be understood in such a way ‘that the question of the 
grounds of validity of the legal order as such, of a further justification of the law by 
means of a higher normative order has to be rejected’.28
In the context of legal theory these arguments lead to a reversal of the burden of 
establishing legitimacy and to a release of the abovementioned arguments from the bur-
dens imposed on them by the history of ideas: positive law is valid as a sovereign order 
in and of itself and overstretched demands of validity are rejected just as claims of valid-
ity: that positive law is valid in and of itself does not mean that this validity carries with 
itself some transcendent meaning, some meaning which goes beyond this validity. the 
meaning of the legal norm x comes to light only via the norm Y that authorises its enact-
ment. the illegitimacy of such a systematically conceived conception of validity does not 
already arise from the fact that such validity presupposes a basic norm. rather the feeling 
of illegitimacy often accompanying such a foundation of validity is an illusion produced 
by coming to positive law with questions which were, first, originally directed at natural 
law and, secondly, could, in effect, not be answered by natural law. 
E. concLuSIon
the law is thus valid only insofar as and because it is valid. this is the only possible 
answer to the question of the ground of validity both of the single legal norm and of 
the law as such. Any other answer would be engaging in metaphysics. the law therein 
26 Ibid, 97.
27 Ibid, 97. 
28 Kelsen (n 8) 88.
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has a similar fate to the world as such, which is only insofar and because it is. this is 
unsatisfactory only to those who believe that the law owes us further answers. However, 
such further answers would be telling too much. they would not only tell us that the law 
is valid if it is valid, but that under certain conditions, conditions to be provided by the 
respective theory, the law ought to be valid, ie that it is already valid even though it is not 
yet valid.
